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PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

ON THE MORAL NEUTRALITY OF SCIENTIFIC ACCEPTANCE
Robert Audi
Department of Philosophy
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588

moral standards of validation which protect us from subjectivity or prejudice.

This paper explores the question of whether scientific acceptance
of hypotheses requires making moral or other non-epistemic judgments.
Much of the paper discusses the controversy surrounding an influential
argument proposed by Richard Rudner to show that scientists qua
scientists must make value judgments. Isaac Levi's well-known critique
of Rudner's argument is examined, and the argument is assessed both in
the light of Levi's distinction between accepting a hypothesis and acting
on it, and in terms of a partial analysis of what constitutes scientific
acceptance. On the basis of this analysis, the question whether scientists
may properly accept hypotheses, rather than simply assess their degree
of confirmation, is also briefly explored. The paper concludes that none
of the arguments considered shows either that scientists should never
accept hypotheses or that, when they do, moral considerations must
form part of the basis of their decision.

t

t

This conception of the moral neutrality of scientific acceptance has been challenged even by those who accept, as
most philosophers of science do, a far-reaching distinction
between the context of validation and that of discovery. The
issue is of major importance for understanding science and,
less obviously, of almost equal significance for understanding
ethics. For even those who recognize important similarities
between ethics and science as disciplines which develop
theories to explain data have tended to take scientific method
-as applied to validation-to be morally neutral; and certainly the contrast between normative questions, such as
what sorts of actions are right, and factual questions, has
usually assumed that scientific hypotheses are paradigms of
factual propositions assessible without using any moral notions
or presupposing answers to any moral questions. If this
assumption is mistaken, then ethics as a normative discipline
cannot be understood in contrast to science, if indeed the
normative-factual distinction can still be plausibly maintained. Moreover, if, even in the context of validation, scientists must make moral judgments or use moral concepts, the
standard view that scientific method provides an objective
way to study nature is weakened. For while there may well be
an objective method for assessing moral judgments, this is
highly controversial. If the proper use of scientific method
requires making moral judgments, the case for the objectivity
of the method must be recast, and clearly appeals to the
method as a neutral way of adjudicating between certain
competing moral views will be undermined.

t

Scientific method is widely regarded as a way of approaching important questions without prejudice. It is commonly believed that since its proper use is neutral with respect
to moral issues it constitutes a court of appeal where people
with opposing moral views can settle certain of their differences. If, for instance, competing theories of social justice are
supported by conflicting factual claims about the effects of
certain methods of distribUting benefits and burdens, these
claims might be assessed by scientific procedures that do not
favor any moral position. The results of scientific inquiry,
then, could provide an objective basis for deciding fairly between the two moral positions. To be sure, it is generally admitted that in the choice of research problems or even in the
formation of hypotheses scientists may be influenced by their
moral views. But this may be plausibly said to affect only the
context of discovery, not that of validation: moral commitments may affect-quite properly-what is selected for scientific study, and they may sometimes (and here improperly)
affect what hypotheses are created; but when it comes to what
hypotheses are SCientifically accepted there are rigorous, non-

The case against the moral neutrality of scientific acceptance will be explored in Section I. What constitutes
acceptance, whether it is essential to scientific inquiry, and
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how non-epistemic factors may affect it will be considered.
The point of departure is the widely known exchange between
Rudner and Levi, to which we now turn.
I

Rudner (1953) provided what is to date perhaps the
most plausible case for the view that the scientist qua scientist
makes value judgments. The force of "qua" is largely to imply
that moral or other non-epistemic normative judgments are
characteristically required for the scientific acceptance of hypotheses. His central argument runs as follows:
1.

The scientist qua scientist accepts or rejects hypotheses.

2.

This requires deciding whether the evidence is sufficiently strong to warrant accepting the hypothesis.

3.

The scientist's decision whether the evidence is strong
enough to warrant accepting the hypothesis is "a
function of the importance, in the typically ethical
sense, of making a mistake in accepting or rejecting
the hypothesis." Hence,

4.

The scientist qua scientist makes value judgments.

Rudner illustrated with reference to the hypothesis that a
toxic ingredient in a drug is not present in lethal quantity:
"we would require a relatively high degree of confirmation or
confidence before accepting the hypothesis-for the consequences of making a mistake here are exceedingly grave by our
moral standards," and "how sure we need to be before we accept [such} a hypothesis will depend on how serious a mistake
would be." Rudner (1953) was quite aware of the objection
that a scientist's business is only to determine the degree of
confirmation of a hypothesis. His reply was that this only
moves his point to different territory. "For the determination
that the degree of confirmation is, say, p ... is clearly nothing
more than the acceptance by the scientist of the hypothesis
that the degree of confidence is p. "
These arguments have been widely discussed and often
criticized. Levi (1960) evaluated them in detail and has discussed the central issues in a number of other places. It will be
useful to begin by considering his initial response to Rudner.
He first attacked Premise 3. His central criticism was that
choosing to accept a hypothesis does not entail choosing
to act on it in relation to any specific objective. For "a person
can meaningfully and consistently be said to accept a hypothesis without having a practical objective." Thus, one can
accept a hypothesis in an open-ended situation and hence need
not thereby choose to act on it relative to any particular
objective.

Levi (1960) also considered another line of reply to
Rudner, which, at the time, he drew from Carnap (1950),
Hempel (1949), and Jeffrey (1956). On this view, acceptance of hypotheses is not required of scientists; rather,
they should be content to assign degrees of confirmation
to hypotheses relative to the available evidence, and "anyone
who is confronted with a practical decision problem can
go to the scientist to ascertain the degrees of confirmation
of the relevant hypotheses" (Levi, 1960). Levi rejected this
as "like crashing into Scylla to avoid Charybdis," and he
attempted to reconcile his view that scientists do accept
and reject hypotheses, with the value-neutrality of science.
He based his reconciliation on two contentions. The first
was that:
The necessity of assigning minimum probabilities for
accepting or rejecting hypotheses does not imply
that the values, preferences, temperament, etc. of the
investigator, or of the group whose interests he serves,
determine the assignment of these minima (Levi,
1960).
Second, the value neutrality thesis does not preclude the
scientist qua scientist's making any value judgments. What it
requires is that "given his commitment to the canons of inference he need make no further value judgments."
Regarding this last point, Levi did not commit himself on the crucial question "whether the canons of scientific inference dictate assignments of minimum probabilities
in such a way as to permit no differences in the assignments
made by different investigators to the same set of alternative hypotheses." He has treated this and similar questions at
length in more recent writings (e.g., Levi, 1967). A detailed
discussion of his views on the issue will not be necessary
since our concerns are essentially neutral with respect to
specific criteria of confirmation or acceptance and should
apply to any plausible set of such criteria. For our purposes,
criteria of confirmation and acceptance need to be considered
only in relation to the question whether, in evaluating scientific hypotheses, scientists as such must make moral or other
non-epistemic normative judgments, where epistemic judgments are, paradigmatically, judgments of the degree of
warrant of a statement relative to a particular body of evidence for it. In discussing this, two distinct though related
issues will be considered: whether moral or other non-epistemic
normative judgments must be made in the scientific acceptance of a hypothesis, and whether they must be made in
the scientific assessment of the degree of confirmation of a
hypothesis. Before proceeding, however, we need to consider
what constitutes acceptance. As often as this notion has been
used in recent literature, it remains very much in need of
further clarification (see, e.g., Burks, 1977; Kaplan, 1981;
Swinburne, 1980; and Teller, 1980).
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At times "acceptance" is so used that it might be supposed that accepting a proposition is equivalent to believing
it. But as the term figures in discussions of accepting and
rejecting hypotheses, belief is surely only a necessary condition for acceptance. Consider cases in which a scientist decides
whether a hypothesis is acceptable and as a result of his reflections accepts it. Here acceptance is surely an event (though not
necessarily an action). Accepting in this sense entails assenting
to, or in some sense adopting, the proposition, forming the
belief that it is true, and, for a time, at least, believing it. There
is also a dispositional use of "accept," on which to say that
one accepts a hypothesis is, roughly, to say that one believes it
and to suggest that one accepts it in the above sense. This is
the use in which we speak of the body of hypotheses a scientist accepts at a given time. It might be argued that there is a
quite different, dispositional use; that, e.g., a person who walks
into an ordinary, well-lighted lecture room accepts the proposition that there are seats in it, even though he has not
assented to this but has merely seen that it is so. This seems,
at best, loose parlance, in which accepting is assimilated to
believing. Perhaps what gives this conception of accepting
plausibility is the correct point that if the person did for
some reason entertain the proposition he would accept it.
These considerations suggest that a person is properly
said to accept a hypothesis, h, only if its credibility has been
considered, however unselfconsciously. Perhaps this does not
hold in general, but it certainly seems to hold for scientific
acceptance. Indeed, it seems typical of the scientific acceptance of a hypothesis that the person not only considers the
credibility of it, but forms a belief about its credibility -e.g.,
that h is highly confirmed by the evidence-and comes to believe it in part on the basis of that further belief about its
credibility. (This further belief may well not express a numerical degree of confirmation, for most scientists do not suppose
degree of confirmation is in general accurately measurable
by current procedures, and hence do not in general attribute a
specific numerical degree of confirmation to their hypotheses.)
Often, moreover, scientific acceptance of h will involve not
only a belief of h and a further one regarding its credibility,
but a second-order belief about the warrant (evidence, conftrmation, grounds) one has for belief that h.
If scientific acceptance does have this twofold character
and thus involves, typically, both the belief that h and at least
one other belief, usually one about the credibility of h or one
about the warrant for believing h, then care must be taken
to avoid ambiguity. If we talk, e.g., of the strength of acceptance, a distinction between the strength of the belief that h
and the strength of the quite different belief that h is confirmed by the evidence must be made. Still another thing is the
degree to which the scientist believes h is conftrmed by the

evidence. Even when he takes it to be high, say, 0.85, he may
suspend judgment on h. If it is not believed in such a case,
there may be a second-order belief that belief of h is barely
warranted. Such second-order beliefs may also differ both in
strength and in degree of subjective probability.
Evaluation can of course occur in arriving at any of the
beliefs just specified, and it may be different in each case. For
instance, in arriving at the belief that h is well confirmed by
the data, the scientist may simply judge intuitively, or may
explicitly use certain principles of confirmation. Doing the
latter may, depending on the case, be rather straightforward.
In arriving at the belief that h, however, there may be reliance
on special epistemic principles, e.g. "Do not accept a hypothesis with a probability on the evidence less than 0.99." A nonscientist or a scientist employing extra-scientific criteria of
acceptance might instead (or in addition) use an ethical principle of acceptance, drawn from, say, an "ethics of belief."
Such a principle might prohibit belief in a hypothesis whose
probability on the evidence is less than 0.99; it might prohibit
this only where the matter in question is in some specified
way important; or it might require a minimum difference in
probability between an acceptable hypothesis and any competing one.
It is important that so far scientific acceptance has been
taken to imply belief. This reflects how acceptance is normally
construed. But it may be construed differently, in terms of
what, at the time in question, the scientist would defend if
the aim were to defend the truth. This is the conception proposed by Kaplan (1981). He offered it, in part, to dissociate
acceptance from subjective probability. One reason for this is
that a probabilistic rule of acceptance leads, given plausible
assumptions, to the Lottery Paradox. Suppose, e.g., the rule
is that a hypothesis should be accepted when its probability
on the evidence is at least 0.999. Confronted by a fair lottery
with 1,000 tickets, one would then believe, of each ticket,
that it will lose, while believing that (since the lottery is
fair) one of these very tickets will win! Probabilistic rules of
acceptance of the kind illustrated must be rejected. But acceptance does not require the belief of an accepted hypothesis
to represent it as having a specific probability, so there is little
temptation to impose a probabilistic rule of acceptance. Kaplan (l981) has also eliminated subjective probabilities as necessary components of acceptance, but at the cost of separating
it, in some cases, from belief -since there are various propositions, e.g. obvious logical consequences of some beliefs,
which one does not believe but would defend if their truth
were questioned. Kaplan's notion of acceptance, then, will
not be adopted; but such a minimal notion is available and the
use of it provides another way to approach the question
whether scientific acceptance is morally neutral. Indeed,
Kaplan's approach to the logic of acceptance supports the
view of scientific acceptance defended here.
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Given these distinctions between kinds of acceptance, we
are in a good position to evaluate Rudner's argument. Consider his crucial Premise 3: The scientist's decision whether the
evidence is strong enough to warrant accepting the hypothesis
(h) is a function of the importance, in the typically ethical
sense, of making a mistake in accepting or rejecting it. This
wording-particularly the phrase "decision whether the evidence is strong enough to warrant accepting the hypothesis" runs together two questions we have been distinguishing.
(1) What is the degree of confirmation of h on the evidence?
(2) Is h acceptable? (Clearly this may be simply a matter of
having a certain minimum level, usually but not necessarily
expressed numerically, of confirmation on the evidence.)
Granted, adopting an epistemic standard for answering questions of the second kind involves evaluation. But Rudner did
nothing to show that it need be moral evaluation, or even need
be done with possible application to morally significant cases
in mind. He talked, however, as if a separate evaluative question - "is this evidence strong enough to warrant accepting this
hypothesis?" -must come up in typical cases of acceptance,
as if for each case there are special considerations, such as the
practical implications of acceptance, which must be weighed.
Certainly such questions might come up and might lead to
reassessment of the relevant epistemic standard; but that need
not happen. Moreover, either of the questions-(l) and (2)that does come up in deciding the scientific acceptability of h
could lead to such reassessment. But answering them does not
require it, and Rudner did not show that scientific acceptance
entails the application of standards beyond those a scientist
has already adopted beforehand, quite possibly on purely
epistemic grounds.
This assessment of Rudner's crucial premise is a good
background for evaluating some key elements in Levi's reply,
outlined earlier. Surely, as Levi and others have maintained,
a hypothesis can be accepted without having in mind any
specific practical objective. This point may be sufficient to
block Rudner's argument. The general issue might be assessed
further, however. Suppose that a scientist does accept a hypothesis with the idea of using it to solve practical problems.
(a) He need not and perhaps should not be prepared to stake
anything on it-which is the most important case of acting on
it. For he may believe that the relevant actions would not be
warranted without further evidence, or that until others can
be expected to accept it no action should be taken on it. Thus,
(b) two quite different questions can and should still be distinguished. (i) Is the hypothesis scientifically acceptable?
(ii) Given how probable it is on the scientific evidence for the
hypothesis, is it reasonable to act on it?
Question (ii) will have different reasonable answers as
applied to different actions. It mayor may not have moral
ramifications. In either case, however, it is not a question for
the scientist as such, though competently answering it may

require scientific training or some conceptual sophistication.
The plausibility of both (a) and (b) is readily seen in the light
of the twofold character of scientific acceptance, stressed
above. For instance, if one accepts h, while having the secondorder belief that acceptance is just barely warranted by available evidence, in believing it, it is easy to see how one might
be reluctant to act on it. Apart from acts in which little is
at stake, commitment to any action on the hypothesis without
more evidence may be avoided. One may embrace before one
is ready to trust.
All this can be illustrated by the drug example. The scientist may accept the hypothesis of its non-toxicity with the
hope of eventually using it widely as medication and with the
intention to test it further, yet-as Levi would agree-justifiably decide not to support its general use. This illustrates the
distinction just made: the scientist, as scientist, answers the
question of scientific acceptability positively, but, as a responsible moral agent, negatively answers the question whether,
given the scientific evidence, it is reasonable to put the drug
into general use. This should not, however, be described as a
refusal to "act on" the hypothesis [as Levi (1960) suggested] .
The refusal is less general than that, and it is relative to a
context. Thus, the scientist's acceptance of the hypothesis
might carry a willingness to act on it in some situations,
e.g. where forced, in a life-or-death situation, to decide whether to use it. Presumably here the scientist would, for himself
at least, use the drug; and surely he might act on the hypothesis at least to the extent of arguing that it deserves further
testing.
This sort of relation between acceptance and action may
be part of what motivated Rudner's argument: surely it is
plausible to hold that accepting a hypothesis implies a disposition to act on it in some possible circumstances. But this
disposition is consistent with a second-order belief that the evidence is just barely sufficient to warrant believing h and does
not justify staking anything on h. Thus, the toxicity example
and similar ones do not undermine the distinction between
questions (i) and (ii), or show that (i) cannot be non-morally
and objectively answered. As suggested, one reason why this
distinction is missed may be that acceptance of h is often mistakenly construed as simply believing it. But in fact acceptance
carries varying degrees of conviction that h, and varying beliefs
about the credibility of h. A rational person neither acquires
conviction whose strength is disproportionate to his assessment
of the evidence, nor, in acting, stakes more on an accepted
hypothesis than is warranted by his degree of conviction in
accepting it or by the specific probability, if any, he attributes
to it.
These points bear on a recent attempt by Gaa (1977) to
undermine the view that science is morally autonomous. We
are asked to imagine a situation in which a scientist studying
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a freshwater lake system arrives at what are taken to be a
number of scientifically acceptable hypotheses about relations
among the constituents in the system. Now suppose that a
policy-maker needs to decide what, if anything, to do about
"nuisance algal bloom" in bodies of water of the relevant
kind.
Since a probability value ... on the relevant hypothesis is also needed in making the decisions, a hypothesis
concerning what that probability value is, must be
accepted-and the costs associated with doing so are,
in general, different. Presumably, the costs of error
in the policymaker's case are much higher than those
of the scientist .... Now, the autonomy thesis requires in such a situation that the scientist should
ignore the needs of the policymaker-since the needs
of the former come first (and, indeed, alone), there is
no reason to gather more evidence (Gaa, 1977).
The upshot is that "in the kinds of situations just delineated,
the scientist qua scientist should act unethically."
Whereas Rudner argued that scientists qua scientists make
value judgments, Gaa argued in addition that if they do not,
then living up to the moral autonomy of science thesis may
require them to act unethically. Two points may be made in
reply.
First, the phrase "the costs associated with doing so,"
i.e., with accepting such a value, implies willingness to act on
the hypothesis, if only by leaving the nuisance algal bloom

alone. But by itself it does not imply this; it implies it only
given (among other things) a further judgment of how well
confirmed the hypothesis must be to justify acting on it. That
judgment will be in part based on moral considerations, but it
is not one the scientist as such should make. One might reply
that even apart from such a judgment, the policy-maker must
act on the hypothesis, since he must put a chemical in the
lake or not. It is true that this must be done or not, but neither action need be based on the hypothesis; hence, neither need
be acting on it. For example, the lake might simply be left
alone on the ground that there is no good reason to do otherwise.
The second point is that nothing in the moral autonomy
thesis, or in the view that scientific acceptance is morally
neutral, entails that "the scientist should ignore the needs of
the policymaker." Surely Gaa forgot here that the autonomy
thesis concerns the scientist qua scientist. Such a scientist is,
of course, an abstraction, a convenient but unfortunately misleading device for talking about the logic of the scientific
enterprise. One cannot be a scientist qua scientist without also
being a person. A person should be ethically responsible,
and, of course, the person who is a scientist studying lakes

should, if possible given moral obligations and resources, provide the policy-maker more information. But this is consistent
with the scientist qua scientist being motivated wholly by a
desire to pursue a purely scientific quest for truth. One would
hope, moreover, that the figures the policy-maker gets from
the scientist are based on just such a quest. It would be most
unfortunate if the only scientific assessments of hypotheses
the former could get were filtered through the scientist's moral
judgments.
III
So far, the view that scientists as such do not accept
hypotheses has not been discussed. As Levi has contended,
adopting this view is not necessary to defending the thesis that
scientific acceptance does not require making moral judgments. But why should Levi have said that adopting it is like
fleeing from Charybdis into the hands of Scylla? Granted,
scientists often accept and sometimes even argue vehemently
for hypotheses. But this could be regarded as extra-scientific;
even the scientific search for truth could be accounted for by
saying that scientists seek to articulate the best confirmed
hypotheses and theories they can discover in the relevant
scientific domain (perhaps allowing simplicity to figure as a
subsidiary ideal). If, as human beings, they cannot help accepting certain apparently true hypotheses or theories, this only
shows that they operate in two roles: the scientific and the
pragmatic. To be sure, on this view scientists would still tentatively accept judgments of the degree of confirmation of
various hypotheses, or at least comparative judgments to the
effect that one hypothesis is better confirmed than its rivals.
But they need not accept any actual scientific hypothesis.
This view of science is not indefensible, but it seems preferable to conceive the scientific enterprise more broadly. If
it is supposed that scientists as such accept hypotheses, then
the view expressed by Levi and others, that the value-neutrality thesis-and scientific objectivity in general-does allow
those value judgments which are implicit in the canons of
scientific inference is accepted. These are plausibly considered
purely epistemic, and it is reasonable to suppose that they
could be made by a purely epistemic agent, in the sense of
one whose only aims are to believe (certain sorts of) truths
and avoid erroneous beliefs. Similarly, scientific objectivity
allows scientists to make what Nagel (1961) called "characterizing value judgments," which are, roughly, judgments of the
value of a thing as a means to something else. These too may
be plausibly argued to be neither in any sense moral nor necessarily open to bias by subjective influences. The question of
when a hypothesis is acceptable relative to the evidence is one
on which rational persons may disagree. But enough has been
said to suggest why it is not a moral question. The values it
involves are epistemic: acceptability here is analogous to the
notion of a good (deductive or inductive) argument, not to
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that of a right act. Rudner was thus mistaken in claiming that
determining the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis is itself
accepting a hypothesis whose assessment involves value considerations of a moral or at least non-epistemic kind. A good
argument itself may not be morally neutral, but a prima facie
cogent case for that position has apparently not been made.
This way of replying to Rudner's claim contrasts with the
view taken by Levi, at least in his initial response to Rudner.
Levi there suggested that the claim can be refuted only by
establishing a positive answer to the question whether "the
canons of scientific inference dictate the assignment of minimum probabilities in such a way as to permit no differences in
the assignments made by different investigators to the same
... hypotheses." This is an important question whose answer
is not clear. No attempt will be made to answer it here. However, defense of the moral neutrality of scientific acceptance
does not require a positive answer.
It is essential, in discussing the notion of acceptability,
to bear in mind an adequate distinction between the vagueness
of concepts or claims and their subjectivity. Consider the claim
that something is blue. It is vague. Is it also subjective?
Granted, vagueness often allows subjective judgments to generate disagreements. The vagueness of "intelligent," e.g., may
lead to disagreements about someone's intelligence, based on
subjective judgments of "brightness." But notice that it is
possible to be clearly right or clearly wrong about colors (or
intelligence), in a way in which it does not seem possible to be
clearly right or clearly wrong in many matters of taste (those
plausibly considered subjective). Moreover, disagreement over
whether something is blue can often be resolved by attention
to terminology. These and related points show that vagueness
does not entail subjectivity, and surely that applies to "acceptability" as well as to many other terms.

Notice also that most people will agree that certain specimens are paradigms of blue, and these can be appealed to in
resolving some disagreements about non-paradigm cases. A
similar point holds for scientific hypotheses in respect to
acceptability; and, just as the epistemically cautious will not
apply "blue" where their less strict colleagues do-without
this implying either subjectivity or any (non-epistemic) value
judgment-scientists may differ in the application of "acceptable" without this implying either subjectivity or any (nonepistemic) value judgment.
Applying this to questions of the confirmation and acceptability of hypotheses, suppose for the sake of argument
that a precise method cannot be found, which commands the
assent of all rational persons who understand it, for assigning
inductive probabilities to hypotheses given the scientific evidence for them, and suppose that even if it were found, scientists would disagree on the minimum probability required for

acceptability. If there is high intersubjective agreement among
scientists on (a) whether purported evidence confirms a
hypothesis and (b) which of two competing hypotheses, if
either, is better confirmed by the purported scientific evidence, the notions of confirmation and acceptability might
still be sufficiently objective to sustain, in the assessment of
hypotheses, the moral neutrality thesis and scientific objectivity. Such intersubjective agreement may not exist among
scientists; but it has not been shown to be an unrealistic ideal,
and it is certainly more readily defended than the quantitative
ideal to which some people apparently want to tie scientific
objectivity.

IV
We may conclude, then, that neither Rudner's argument
nor similar ones show that the scientific acceptance of hypotheses requires making moral or other non-epistemic judgments.
It may be true that even if scientists qua scientists do not accept scientific hypotheses they do accept propositions about
degrees of confumation which might be called hypotheses;
and there certainly appear to be alternative rational sets of
criteria of acceptance and of confirmation. Perhaps selecting
of one or another set of either kind can be shown to require
moral considerations; but this does not appear to have been
shown. Moreover, if it turns out that, on any plausible criteria, "degree of confirmation" and "acceptability" remain
vague, it may not be inferred either that they are not objective
or that differences in their application must be attributed
to moral or other non-epistemic normative judgments. When
Rudner's (1953) arguments-and the many similar ones proposed since -are rightly understood in the light of these points
and the distinctions developed above, they cease to appear
to undermine the thesis that scientific acceptance is, in principle, morally neutral.
There remain two important and often neglected problems which have not been broached. First, if simplicity is a
properly scientific criterion of acceptability, is there an objective way of judging it? Second, even if the inductive probability of a hypothesis given the scientific evidence for it can
be determined precisely, how can it be determined objectively when there is enough evidence-and enough warrant for
believing the evidence statements-to make even a high inductive probability justify actually accepting the hypothesis?
If these problems cannot be resolved, then the defense of
the moral neutrality thesis, and of scientific objectivity in general, may at least need to move closer to the view that scientists
qua scientists do not accept or reject hypotheses. The problems can perhaps be resolved, and reasons given here suggest
that the relevant issues are epistemic and prima facie capable
of objective resolution. In any case, supposing the defense of
the moral neutrality of science does require adopting the view
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that scientists qua scientists do not accept or reject scientific
hypotheses, this narrower view of scientific practice is unlikely
to prevent adequate treatment of the central questions in the
philosophy of science. At present, however, we may apparently suppose that scientists qua scientists do accept hypotheses
and that scientific acceptance is, in principle, morally neutral.
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